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I.
The anti-trust bills bring before Congress the whole theory
and conduct of modern business. They involve in greater or less
degree manufacturers, trade unions, agricultural associations,
railways, banks, department stores, producers, consumers, whole-
salers, middlemen, retailers. Many interests are demanding
for themselves recognition, protection, exemption and for others
restraint and destruction-each instinctively parading its own
merit, its own grievance. The economic controversy between
regulated combination and enforced competition is well to the
fore and we may not avoid the political controversy over central-
ization of power.
Much of the running criticism of the anti-trust bills has
served to emphasize specific defects and, as a whole, it has per-
formed a greater serVice in assuring a deliberate consideration
for great questions of law and policy. But, as each day brings
new suggestions, running criticism is much like trying to keep
tab on a kaleidoscope and so it should be paralleled by a study
of fundamentals pursued without regard to the daily bulletin.
While there is no time to be lost, in making this study, sufficient
time is assured by the fact that no anti-trust bill will express the
will of Congress until it shall have passed the ordeals of commit-
tee reports in each House, of thorough debate, in the Senate at
least, of a conference report and of final vote, and no bill can
become law without executive approval. Until final action the
whole anti-trust programme should be treated as in a state of
flux-a provision discarded may reappear at the last moment-
one seemingly fixed may disappear and I should say that no bill
will be given precedence-all will be submitted together in order
to assure the final declaration of a homogeneous policy.
Utilizing this opportunity for discussion I will consider several
of the leading questions, especially whether the "rule of reason"
is to yield to the misrule of unreason, and I present now some
thoughts on the Trade Commission Bill (H. R. 1463f) and espe-
cially on the inquisitorial power it purports to confer.
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II.
The bill in question which was introduced March 16 with the
approval of the House Committee on Interstate Commerce is,
so far as this committee is concerned, substituted for H. R.
12,120 of January 22.
By Section 3 there is "vested" in the commission all the exist-
ing powers, authority and duties of the Bureau of Corporations
and of the Commissioner of Corporations contained in an act en-
titled, "an act to establish the Department of Commerce and
Labor," approved February 14, 1903, and all amendments there-
to, and contained in resolutions of the United States Senate
passed on March 1, 1913, on May 27, 1913, and on June 18,
1913." Turning to the Bureau Act we read: "The said com-
missioner shall have power and authority to make, under the di-
rection and control of the Secretary of Commerce and Labor,
diligent investigation into the organization, conduct and man-
agement of the business of any corporation, joint stock company
or corporate combination engaged in the commerce among the
several states and with foreign nations, excepting common car-
riers subject to an "Act to Regulate Commerce, approved Febru-
ary fourth, eighteen hundred and eighty-seven, and to gather
such information and data as will enable the President of the
United States to make recommendations to Congress for legisla-
tion for the regulation of such commerce, and to report such
data to the President from time to time as he shall require;
and the information so obtained or as much thereof as the Pres-
ident may direct shall be made public."
By Section 9 "Every corporation, engaged in commerce, ex-
cepting corporations subject to the Acts to regulate commerce,
which, by itself or with one or more other corporations owned,
operated, controlled, or organized in conjunction with it so as to
constitute substantially a business unit, has a capital of $5,-
000,000 or more, or has less capital and belongs to any class of
corporations which the commission may make, shall furnish
to the commission annually, such information, statements, and
records of its 'organization, bondholders and stockholders, and
financial condition, and also such information, statements and
records of its relation to other corporations and its business and
practices while engaged in commerce as the commission shall re-
quire, and the commission may, to enable it the better to carry
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out the purposes of this Act, prescribe as near as may be a uni-
form system of annual reports."
By Section 10 "The commission shall, upon the direction of
the President, the Attorney General, or either House of Con-
gress investigate the organization, management, and business of
any corporation while engaged in commerce, to aid in ascertain-
ing whether or not the corporation investigated is violating the
acts relating to restraint of trade. And the commission shall
make a report of such investigation, which may include recom-
mendations for readjustment of business in order that said cor-
poration may thereafter maintain its organization, management,
and conduct of business in accordance with law. Reports made
after investigation may be made public in the discretion of the
commission."
By Section 11 "When in the course of any investigation made
under this act the commission shall obtain information concern-
ing any unfair competition or practice in commerce not necessar-
ily constituting a violation of law by the corporation investigated,
it shall make report thereof to the President, to aid him in mak-
ing recommendations to Congress for legislation in relation to.
the regulation of commerce, and the information so obtained and
the report thereof shall be made public only upon the direction
of the President."
By Section 12 "Tn any suit in equity brought by or under the
direction of the Attorney General, as provided in the acts relat-
ing to restraint of trade, the court in which said suit is pending
may at any time during the progress of the case refer to the
commission any question arising in the litigation )r any proposed
decree therein, whereupon the commission shall investigate the
matters referred to it and shall make a full report of its investi-
gation to the court."
III.
The power given the commission by *Section 9 to make "any
class of corporation" among those of less than $5,000,000
capital and take jurisdiction of them suggests constitutional dif-
ficulty.
The rule against delegating legislative power to administrative
bodies has come to be more liberally construed under the tre-
mendous pressure of the functions assumed by the modern state
but the principle and the range of their jurisdiction-whether of
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persons or matters-should, if not fully mapped out by the legis-
lature, be indicated sufficiently to preclude a loose right of selec-
tion. For if an act of the body be not rooted in jurisdiction duly
conferred by the law-making authority it is without warrant-
and this is equally true of classification for jurisdictional pur-
poses.
The commission, however, appears to be free to select some,
or to embrace all corporations of less than $5,000,000 capi-
tal by means of one or more classifications formed at pleasure.
It may surprise Congress by following its lead and classify by
capital-more than $4,000,000-$500,000-$100,000. It may
classify generally, as by gross returns of whatever amount;
or specially, as by industries-mines, mail order houses, steel
companies, department stores, etc. It may classify permanently,
for regular reports, etc., or temporarily for a special exploring
operation. Whether any or all of the thousands of corporations
below the $5,000,000 mark shall be within or without the law is
left to the taste aiid fancy of the commission.
What is meant by the permission accorded the courts in Sec-
tion 12 to refer to the commission "any question arising in the
litigation"? Many questions arise. What sort is it supposed a
court would deem the regular judicial machinery less competent
to deal with than a body without judicial power, without legal
training-an administrative body immersed in the multitudinous
details of corporate industry? If, as we assume, the commission
is supposed to be able to obtain outside the court better evidence
than the Department of Justice can present inside, what are the
defendant's position and rights? Will there be a proceeding be-
fore the commission? Will the commission make private in-
quiry, and what shall be the evidentiary status of its report?
Vested with all the inquisitorial powers of the Bureau of Cor-
porations the commission is freed from a wholesome restriction
imposed on the Bureau in the matter of publicity. While the
Bureau reports to the President, who may give out information
at his discretion, "the information obtained by the commission
in the exercise of the powers, authority and duties conferred up-
on it by this [third] section may be made public at the discretion
of the commission."
According to newspaper report (Evening Post, March 18), Mr.
Covington, chairman of the sub-committee that framed the Bill,
says: "The independent initiative of the commission is preserved
YALE LAW JOURNAL
in every part of the bill except the single section in which the
commission is made the investigating agent of the President, the
Attorney General or either House of Congress to report to them
the facts found as to alleged violations of the Anti-Trust laws.
There is nowhere in the bill any restriction on the independent
powers which may be constitutionally exercised by the commis-
sion to make investigations of any sort, and to make pub-
lic the facts disclosed in its discretion. In fact, this discretion is
simply to safeguard the public by withholding information which
discloses such violations as will warrant prosecution through the
Department of Justice, and when the publicity might gravely
prejudice the government's case." Stating that the provision for
the punishment of persons unlawfully disclosing information
does not apply to newspapers he says: "That section is simply
to punish officials or employees of the commission who may with-
out authority betray information which happens to be a proper
trade secret or the disclosure of which would impede the gov-
ernment in trust prosecutions." Are we to infer that "proper
trade secrets" may be published by "authority?"
I have noted what are, in my opinion, certain defects in the
Trade Commission Bill. These may be cured without substan-
tially affecting its main function and I have dealt briefly with
them because this function is my theme-the exercise of inquisi-
torial power.
IV.
Properly to appreciate the inquisitorial power of the Trade
Commission we compare this body with the Interstate Commerce
Commission on the one hand and the Bureau of Corporations on
the other.
The Interstate Commerce Commission has jurisdiction over
practically all comiion carriers engaged in interstate commerce.
These carriers are, generally, corporations, but the occasional
partnership and the possible individualistic enterprise are as fully
within the jurisdiction. And all, because they perform the "pub-
lic service" of transportation, are subject to a larger public regu-
lation than are those persons, corporate or individual, who en-
gage in ordinary business.
The Bureau has jurisdiction over all "corporations, joint stock
companies and corporate combinations" engaged in interstate
commerce excepting common carriers and the Trade Commis-
sion over "corporations" only, with a similar exception.
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The Interstate Commerce Commission is essentially a regulat-
ing body-prescribing rules and issuing orders in respect of in-
terstate transportation, -especially by rail.
The sole function of the Bureau and the main function of
the Trade Commission is to obtain information, the one in aid
of legislation, the other, both in aid of legislation and for detect-
ing violations of the Anti-Trust Act.
The Interstate Commerce Commission is sharply differentiated
from the other bodies in question. It has jurisdiction over cer-
tain common carriers, corporate or otherwise, engaged in the
public service of interstate transportation. It is a regulating body
with some attributes of a judicial nature. It enjoys inquisitorial
powers simply as a means to carry out its main purposes.
On the other hand the Bureau and the Trade Commission
have no jurisdiction over "public service" companies-no reg-
ulating power, no judicial attributes. They have simply an in-
quisitorial power over ordinary corporations-chiefly industrial
-who are engaged in interstate commerce.
While the nature and purposes of the Commission and the
strong phrasing of its powers suggest a sharper inquisitorial ac-
tivity than the Bureau has felt free to exercise, the powers of
the one are not essentially greater than those of the other. Each
purports to authorize inquisition without limitation,, withouti
cause shown and without proper formalities.
"The essential likeness is important as showing that the main
constitutional issue is not more deeply involved in the Commis-
sion Bill than in the Bureau Act-it is simply presented more
pointedly and a mere toning down of phrase will not affect its
substance.
V.
In Hale v. Henkel (201 U. S. 75) the Supreme Court said:
"While an individual may lawfully refuse to answer incriminat-
ing questions unless protected by an immunity statute, it does
not follow that a corporation, vested with special privileges and
franchises may refuse to show its hand when charged with an
abuse of such privileges." Remarking that the corporation in
question was chartered by New Jersey the court said: "but such
franchises, so far as they involve questions of interstate com-
merce, must also be exercised in subordination to the power of
Congress to regulate such commerce, and in respect to this the
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general government may also assert a sovereign authority to as-
certain whether such franchises have been exercised in a lawful
manner, with a due regard to its laws. Being subject to this dual
sovereignty, the general government possesses the same right to
see that its own laws are respected as the state would have with
respect to the special franchises vested in it by the laws of the
state. The powers of the general government in this particular
in the vindication of its own laws are the same as if the corpor-
ation had been created by an act of Congress. It is not intended
to intimate, however, that it has a general visitatorial power over
state corporations." The court, however, not only affirmed that
a corporation is protected by the Constitution against unreason-
able searches, but found the subpoena duces tecum in question
"far too sweeping" to be "reasonable."
In Harriman v. Interstate Commerce Commission (211 U. S.
407, 417-421) the court said in regard to the "enormous scope of
the power asserted for the commission": "The legislation that
the commission may recommend embraces, according to the ar-
guments before us, anything and everything that may be con-
ceived to be within the power of Congress to regulate, if it re-
lates to commerce with foreign nations or among the several
states. And the result of the arguments is that whatever might
influence the mind of the commission in its recommendations is a
subject upon which it may summon witnesses before it and re-
quire them to disclose any facts, no matter how private, no mat-
ter what their tendency to disgrace the person whose attendance
has been compelled. If we qualify the statement and say only,
legitimately influence the mind of the commission in the opinion
of the court called in aid, still it will be seen that the power, if it
exists, is unparalleled in its vague extent. * * * How far Congrebq
could legislate on the subject-matter of the questions put to the
witnesses was one of the subjects of discussion, but we pass it
by. Whether Congress itself has the unlimited power claimed by
the commission, we also leave on one side. It was intimated that
there was a limit in Interstate Commerce Commission v. Brim-
son, (154 U. S. 447, 448, 479). Whether it could delegate the
power, if it possessed it, we also leave untouched, beyond remark-
ing that so unqualified a delegation would present the constitu-
tional difficulty in most acute form. * ** The power to require
testimony is limited as it usually is in English-speaking countries
at least to the only cases where the sacrifice of privacy is neces-
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sary-those where the investigations concern a specific breach of
the law. * * * If by virtue of §21 the power exists to summon wit-
nesses for the purpose of recommending legislation, we hardly
see why, under the same section, it should not extend to summon-
ing them for the still vaguer reason that their testimony might
furnish data considered by the commission of value in the deter-
mination of questions connected with the regulation of com-
merce. If we did not think, as we do, that the act clearly showed
that the power to compel the attendance of witnesses was to be
exercised only in connection with the quasi-judicial duties of the
commission, we still should be unable to suppose that such an un-
precedented grant was to be drawn from the counsels of perfec-
tion that have been quoted from §§12 and 21. We could not be-
lieve on the strength of other than explicit and unmistakable
words that such autocratic power was given for any less specific
object of inquiry than a breach of existing law, in which, and in
which alone, as we have said, thereis any need that personal mat-
ters should be revealed."
The latest decision of the Supreme Court of interest is Weeks
v. U. S. (Feb. 24, 1914). The taking of papers from Weeks'
house by a United States marshal without warrant was held to
be an unlawful seizure. "If letters and private documents can
be thus seized and held and used in evidence against a citizen ac-
cused of an offense, the protection of the Fourth Amendment
declaring his right to be secure against such searches and seiz-
ures is of no value, and, so far as those thus placed are concerned,
might as well be stricken from the Constitution. The efforts of
the courts and their officials to bring the guilty to punishment,
praiseworthy as they are, are not to be aided by the sacrifice of
those great principles established by years of endeavor and suf-
fering which have resulted in their embodiment in the fundamen-
tal law of the land." The court supported its opinion by citing
Hale v. Henkel, "wherein it was held that a subpoena duces
tecum requiring a corporation to produce all its contracts and
correspondence with no less than six other companies, as well as
all letters received by the corporation from thirteen other com-
panies located in different parts of the United States, was an un-
reasonable search and seizure within the Fourth Amendment."
In an opinion on the Bureau's powers, I said in conclusion:
"I find that lawful questions should relate to subjects within
range of the constitutional powers of Congress and should
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be directed as closely as possible to eliciting facts germane
to the exercise of these powers, excluding queries prompted
by an impertinent curiosity or a vague desire for informa-
tion. And I find that demands may be lawfully resisted by
an assertion of personal rights whenever compliance would
involve an unwarrantable disclosure of private affairs or an ex-
cessive expenditure of private means x x x. The Act purports
to invest the Bureau with inquisitorial power of wide range and
great severity. For this reason my treatment has been uniformly
critical, as becomes the scrutiny of all inquisitorial laws. For
this reason the Bureau's action should be watched with vigilan
regard for private rights, so that these be not invaded by un-
lawful search; and, with special regard for the integrity of state
corporations, the first opportunity should be taken to maintain
their freedom from a visitorial power in Congress or its dele-
gate. It must be insisted that Congress has no other or greater
power over these corporations, as such, than it has over individ-
ual citizens of the states.
"A deeper incentive to vigilance is the preservation of the proper
jurisdiction of the states. The Bureau of Corporations should
never be allowed to exercise powers suggestive of an exclusive
federal right to regulate all business of more than parochial in-
terest." In this relation I note that the statement of the case in
U. S. v. Armour (142 Fed. Rep., p. 812), recites that the Com-
missioner of Corporations, Mr. Garfield, "testified that he had
previously read a pamphlet of Mr. Randolph (being an opinion
by Carman F. Randolph on the status and powers of the Bureau
of Corporations organized under Section 6 of the Act of Con-
gress creating the Department of Commerce and Labor) and
had in mind, in talking with Mr. Krauthoff, that there was a
line of privacy which, under the Constitution, Congress could
not invade, and that the question as to his investigations invad-
ing that line was a matter for discussion. between them."
As a matter of fact the Bureau has never so pressed its compul-
sory powers to provoke a test of their validity. The Report for
1912 states that they have seldom been exercised, the informa-
tion desired being generally given on request.
The conclusions of the opinion are strengthened by the later
decisions cited. Hale v. Henkel, while maintaining a proper fed-
eral right to see that state corporations respect Federal law,
disclaims any general federal visitorial power over them and
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affirms to them the protection of the Fourth Amendment. And
all the decisions follow the best tradition of our jurisprudence in
condemning the drag-net and the short-cut quest even when a
breach of the law is in question.
If such rough and roving quests are forbidden even when they
are incident to a regular proceeding for vindication of the law
how can they be permitted to a purely administrative body in a
mere search for information, whether it be undertaken in prob-
lematic aid of legislation or on rumor or suspicion of wrong
doing.
VI.
The constitutional argument against inquisitorial power as
this is developed in the Bureau of Corporations Act and in the
Trade Commission Bill, does not deny a real need for informa-
tion or cut off means for its reasonable satisfaction. There is
enough accessible information of the conduct of interstate busi-
ness, great and small, corporate and individual, to facilitate the
handling of our problem, if it be properly selected, stated and,
above all, assimilated. Taking this business by and large, what
need the legislator know that requires a permanent inquisition
to reveal it? And what knowledge shall the public prosecutor
properly gain by substituting a bureaucratic thumbscrew for
the judicial proceeding?
Constitutional obstacles apart there is a serious objection to
the inquisitorial power in question in its implicit assumption of
a widespread wilful violation by industrial corporations of the
Anti-Trust Act, which is, like all statutes, officially presumed
plainly to lay down the law. As the presumption has been, to a
substantial degree, contrary to the fact the assumption unfairly
involves much of our interstate business in a cloud of suspicion.
This should be dissipated and not thickened for we are beginning
to get a judicial interpretation of the Act which, if it be not
vexed by new legislation provoking further years of litigation,
will clarify the law's commands and promote their authority.
Carman F. Randolph.
New York City.
